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The Second World War was a watershed with relation to the institution of so-called 
‘traditional chieftaincy’. In rather abrupt steps, the representatives of the colonial pow-
ers officially distanced themselves from a type of administration in which much of the 
activity on a local and regional scale involved African rulers. In the case of British West 
Africa, this change of direction was particularly spectacular: as the British had made a 
veritable doctrine of their ‘indirect rule’, in which the ‘native leaders’ retained a good 
part of local and regional responsibility and were only ‘corrected’ where necessary, the 
readjustment of this principle towards ‘democratization’ through the Hailey Report and 
other new interpretations of the political reality appeared as particularly radical.1 In the 
French case, the wave of ‘democratization’ – including the introduction of the positions 
of elected territorial councillors who, theoretically, could rival the prestige if not the 
power of the chiefs – followed a climax of reliance on these chiefs under Vichy rule in 
the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), between 1940 and 1943.2 In the Portuguese 
empire, there were attempts to strengthen the position of ‘educated Africans’ in com-
parison to the chiefs, but as there was no political empowerment linked to these evolu-
tions, the crisis of these chiefs came much later. 
After the war, the chiefs did not only lose their political prerogatives, as intermediaries 
in the political administration of the colonies.3 Their existence was also disconnected 
from one of the principal functions they had had in the territories of all colonial empires 
in sub-Saharan Africa: the administration of forced labour. In the French colonies, 
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the chiefs had filled the central role in the organisation of the labour tax, the so-called 
prestations, through which forced labour was orchestrated; in the British colonies, the 
demands for communal labour had normally been addressed to the chiefs, who then had 
to set up the schemes; in territories under Portuguese rule, the chiefs were essential in 
the process of drafting ‘vagabonds’ for corrective state labour or in view of their recruit-
ment for labour contracts on the farms. Forced labour ended in the French case by a gen-
eral law in 1946, in the British colonies it disappeared more silently. Only the Portuguese 
continued with these practices up to 1961, although these became somewhat less intense 
during the 1950s. In all cases, the loss of the function weakened the chiefs. The situation 
was similar in the case of the particular ‘native jurisdiction’, abolished directly after the 
war in the British and French colonies, and, again, in 1961 in the Portuguese case. Before 
the abrogation of separate status for the ‘natives’, many chiefs had informally wielded 
the power to nominate the individuals to be punished – there hardly was any institution 
to which the victims of similar practices could appeal. From the moment when this lever 
was lost, the chiefs were naturally bereaved of a source of respect.4
Nevertheless, the ‘traditional rulers’ were unlikely simply to accept their defeat: the 
change was very rapidly decreed, and local societies would not change from one day 
to the other from systems of rule that had been established over four or five decades. 
In the transitional period of the late colonial states, the chiefs still had possibilities to 
react, and to adapt themselves at the changing circumstances. There is an extreme lack 
of research on the strategies of chiefs during this period.5 This is all the more regrettable 
as the attempts of chiefs to ‘fight back’ in a phase of existential threats against their posi-
tion is very promising to help us come to a better characterisation of chieftaincy under 
colonial domination as a broader phenomenon.
We will use this position as a starting point to come, from the analysis of the chiefly 
response, to a model of chiefly interest, and capacities for adaptation for the whole of 
the colonial period. Our main example will be territories of AOF – Senegal, Guinea-
Conakry, Upper Volta, and Côte d’Ivoire – as the principles of French colonial rule left 
less space to the ‘traditional rulers’, which made it difficult for them to define autono-
mous paths based on the precolonial concepts of political organisation. Comparisons to 
the situations under British and Portuguese rule will however be attempted whenever 
this is useful.
The end of chieftaincy in West Africa: 
a classical interpretation and its modifications
During the second half of the 1940’s and much of the 1950’s, opposition against ‘traditional 
rulers’ within the late colonial societies was a widespread phenomenon. Everywhere in 
West Africa, chiefs came under attack. Until recently, scholars have principally inter-
preted those outbreaks of political and sometimes physical struggle as the attempt of the 
oppressed, mostly rural populations to finish with arbitrary conditions introduced by 
4  MANN, 2009: 349-352.
5  In cases such as Nigeria, where the chiefs survived the end of colonial rule and played a strong initial role within the postcolonial 
government, there is a more open approach to the margins of manoeuvre the important chiefs had, see for Ibadan WATSON, 
2003: 117-144.
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the colonisers and more or less opposed by the local people.6 While we will show that 
these processes normally were more complex, it is necessary to understand this particu-
lar scholarly perspective, which can already be regarded as a ‘classical’ paradigm.
The abolition of the whole institution of chieftaincy is, from that point of view, a nec-
essary step to remove a relic of the colonial state, as Jean Suret-Canale has argued for 
Guinea-Conakry.7 In this interpretation, chieftaincy is something that has either been 
invented or grossly distorted by the European colonial administrations. On the one hand, 
in zones of so-called acephalous societies, ‘societies without rulers’, such as in Igboland 
in Southeastern Nigeria or among the Sereer of parts of Senegal, chieftaincy is regarded 
as having been something completely alien to the experiences of the local populations, 
and forced on them by the colonial power.8 In other contexts, more centralised rule had 
already existed, but, according to the ‘classical paradigm’, the Europeans changed the 
rules of the game, installing their own cronies as the repressive abusers of local structures 
and local wealth.9
Modernisation theory and dependencia modernism both contributed to a theoreti-
cal approach that regarded the chiefs if not as abusive, then, at least, as completely 
outmoded. Historians and sociologists celebrated the attack against chieftaincy led by 
sub-Saharan Africa’s new, autonomous or already independent regimes.10 A striking 
West African case and an early test case was Ghana. Here, many chiefs were removed, 
although this mostly concerned the chiefs affiliated to the political opposition to Kwame 
Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP). Many of the latter lost their posts (or were 
‘destooled’, as was said in the context of Ghana, alluding to the stools of chiefly rule). In 
earlier studies the activities of the CPP are simply regarded as an expression of the ‘will 
of the people’ to get rid of their oppressive chiefs. 
Only very recently, serious doubts have been formulated on the aspect of the complete 
arbitrariness of chieftaincy under colonial rule. In a path-breaking article, Thomas Spear 
has pointed to ‘the limits of invention’, which means that a completely arbitrary rule 
was more than difficult to maintain for a chiefly ruler, who had at least to find some con-
sent among the local populations.11 Single scholars such as Richard Rathbone reversed 
their former positions admitting that chieftaincy had and has a prestige at least in some 
major cases.12
Paul Nugent in his latest broad outlook on postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa writes about 
a reappraisal of the role of chieftaincy in recent scholarship, but it is difficult to see that 
the changed perspective has already been profoundly introduced into historical analy-
sis.13 Where chiefs are no longer represented as a fading force directly before and after 
decolonisation, their impact is not really discussed with relation to the tensions around 
the transfer of local and national power.14 The studies focusing on the renaissance of 
chieftaincy as an intermediary layer, from the 1980s, frequently lack a historical per-
6 MAMDANI, 1996; COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, 1985.
7 SURET-CANALE, 1970: 107-109.
8 AFIGBO, 1979; LENTZ, 2000: 597-599; TOSH, 1978: 42-44; HAWKINS, 1996: 207; SEARING, 2002: 413-414.
9 ALEXANDRE, 1970: 9-10; GESCHIERE, 1993; FIRMIN-SELLERS, 2001: 58; FALOLA, 2009: 80-81.
10  CROWDER & IKIME, 1978: 218; FISIY, 1995: 57-59.
11 SPEAR, 2003: 15-16, 25.
12 RATHBONE, 2000: 3-4; GOCKING, 2000: 218.
13 NUGENT, 2004: 105-106.
14  NEWBURY, 2003: 120-124; VAUGHAN, 2000: 45-68; NWAUBANI, 1994: 356-361; VAUGHAN, 1991: 309-311.
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spective.15 What is obviously missing is an analysis of the exact nature of the tensions 
around chieftaincy in the last years of the colonial states: it is unclear from a comparative 
perspective which was the prestige still enjoyed by local chiefs, and which the responses 
of the late colonial state and its populations to emergent conflicts.
It is obviously difficult to show a broad panorama that allows a quantification of chief-
taincy conflicts in West Africa. We are limited to concentrate on cases in which chief-
taincy was indeed discussed as a crucial problem by the colonial administrations and the 
local populations. However, for our approach we can follow the colonial sources, because 
while being Eurocentric, they show us the way to the particular places and region where 
conflicts emerged. It is also advantageous to include into the picture cases from colo-
nies with different degrees of internal conflict during the democratization and decolo-
nization phase. While territories such as Senegal knew internal tensions that opposed 
different African political forces, Côte d’Ivoire was theatre of the conflict between one 
particular political party and the colonial administration. In Guinea-Conakry the ten-
sions mainly concerned the members of antagonistic African parties, but the level of 
violence was particularly high. We will in the following regard the pressures on chiefs in 
these three exemplary arenas, after the abolition of forced labour and the indigénat had 
severely weakened the position of these chiefs.
Chiefs and democratisation of local politics: 
the end of chiefly authority in Senegal?
Due to a strong tradition of French presence on Senegal’s soil, restricted to a handful of 
commercial bases it is true, but which gained from 1848 considerable political rights and 
constituted the nucleus of administrative control, the role of chieftaincy in this colony 
was somewhat obscured. The colonial administration in the rural parts of Senegal, apart 
from the Quatre Communes with their very particular political status, nevertheless 
relied upon so-called chefs de canton (paramount chiefs of a small ‘traditional’ district), 
village chiefs, and, in some cases, regional chiefs who had more of a symbolic status. 
These chiefdoms were installed after the French conquest of the precolonial states of 
Senegambia – Kajoor, Bawol, Siin, Saluum, Jolof, Waalo, and Fuuta Tooro – in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Many future chiefs had played an active part in the 
conquest on the French side. In the case of Senegal, there seemed to be little reflection 
about potential ethno-cultural solidarities from the part of the colonial authorities: 
Pulaar-speakers (‘Tukulor’) were installed in mainly Wolof-speaking areas, Wolophone 
chiefs and some Pulaar-speakers received chiefly posts in predominantly Sereer-speaking 
regions.16 Moreover, in the official French rhetoric, the role of the precolonial entities for 
the organisation of colonial rule was, for Senegal, presented as entirely irrelevant.
The introduction of democratic structures after 1944 came as a complete rupture with 
former practices of colonial domination throughout West Africa. In the years of the 
15 NOLTE, 2002: 371-373; VAN ROUVEROY VAN NIEUWAAL, 2000: 45-50; MILES, 1993: 42-43. Other works give a historical 
prelude, but which is not too enlightening with regard to the historical trajectory of the position in precolonial times and under 
colonial rule, see VON HELLERMANN, 2010: 263-266.
16 The role of ethnicity in Senegal’s sociopolitical composition under colonial rule is a contested question, see GLASMAN, 2004, 
and KEESE, 2010: 559-561.
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Second World War, Vichy repression and Free French initiatives to use the African 
resources for the war effort had considerably limited the freedom of local communities 
to decide their own affairs.17 The installation of the Fourth Republic in France meant, to 
the contrary, that for the first time policy-makers regarded it as inevitable to give to a con-
siderable group of the local populations the right to elect their representatives in both the 
colonial capitals and in Paris. In the following, these deputies attempted to influence local 
decision-making in their constituencies, although, in the second half of the 1940s, they 
only had the task to vote over national laws in the metropole and to advise the colonial 
authorities in territorial matters, but not to interfere in the local processes. In practice, it 
showed to be impossible to separate both levels. The elected representatives used their 
new networks to carve out an important role for themselves in the regional theatres. 
Senegal was no exception to this rule. As an early example, Jacques d’Erneville, general 
councillor of the region of M’Bour in Senegal and friend of the Senegalese deputy in 
Paris, Léopold Sédar Senghor, claimed to have a voice in the restructuring of administra-
tive units. He attempted to influence the nomination of local chiefs in his constituency 
as early as in 1946.18 
According to the ‘classical’ perspective on the evolution of chieftaincy after the Second 
World War, chiefs are only a remainder of the older mechanisms of colonial domination, 
and, in the 1950s, they were rapidly supplanted by elected representatives.19 Senegal is 
one of the territories where historians believe to find this process: in Senegal, chief-
taincy is abolished after national independence on the level of the canton; on village 
level, the ‘traditional’ posts have survived until the current day, but these village chiefs 
are only second in importance to their almighty rivals, Muslim marabouts from the two 
dominant brotherhoods of the Muridiyya and the Tijaniyya. Already from the late nine-
teenth century, these marabouts have been the more important political force in rural 
Senegal.20
In Senegal, the first territorial elections in 1947 were won by the Senegalese section of 
the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the French Socialist Party, 
which had already dominated the limited arenas of political life in the most politicised 
French colony in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1930s. However, in the second half of 
the 1940s, a political movement led by the famous intellectual and poet Léopold Sédar 
Senghor and by Mamadou Dia, another leading political figure, split from the SFIO 
to found their own party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS). The new political 
formation celebrated sweeping victories in most of the rural constituencies during the 
territorial elections of 1952 and 1957. The election campaigns led to protracted political 
struggles in the Senegalese countryside, which affected the chiefs.21 Although they were 
not being automatically eclipsed in their influence by the general councillors, the chiefs 
nonetheless had a problematic life whenever choosing the wrong side in the political 
battles.
One of those turbulent zones was the coastal region south of Dakar – the Petite Côte 
– where the populations were Sereer-speakers and a minority of Wolof-speakers, and 
17 CHAFER, 2002: 43; BENOIST, 1982: 16-17.
18  BENOIST, 1982: 52-58.
19  This view is summarised in NUGENT, 2004: 130.
20  BABOU, 2007; BABOU, 2005; GRAY, 1988.
21 ATLAN, 2003.
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where local rule had been characterised by instability in a region traditionally claimed 
before the final decades of the nineteenth century by the rulers of the precolonial states 
of Bawol and Siin. In the canton of M’Bayar-Nianing, Socé Fall, the chief, had survived an 
affair of fraud and an interim destitution only by unconditionally adhering to the SFIO, 
which supported his rehabilitation in the first two years after the Second World War.22 
Given the changes in the equilibrium of political forces after Senghor and Dia had left the 
party, Fall consequently became a target of the leaders of the BDS.23 After the BDS land-
slide victory in the 1951 elections for the French National Assembly, it became obvious that 
Socé Fall had set on the wrong horse.24 The Sereer-speaking populations of Malikunda, 
in his district, started a wave of protests against the chief.25 The ‘traditional authority’ in 
neighbouring Bayar canton, Armand N’Diaye, a BDS party member, added to Fall’s diffi-
culties by doing his best to discredit his colleague.26 Nevertheless, Socé Fall survived riots 
and turbulence. In 1958, he is regarded by the administration as being “a respected chief”, 
and there are no other indications than those claiming that the populations in his canton 
were now quite content. The chief had obviously re-established good relations with key 
persons in the canton: he had sought alliances with these local leaders, and this network-
building allowed for political survival even in a period in which ‘modernisation’ was the 
word.27 Only in 1959, did Socé Fall pay the price for his long-standing anti-BDS position. 
As soon as Senegal became an autonomous territory within the French Community, Fall 
was being removed by the new, autonomous Senegalese government.28
It was approximately the same situation with Oumar Bayo Fall, chief in the M’Bayar 
canton of the cercle of Diourbel, which was a former region of precolonial Bawol, and 
in which local rule, supported by Murid Islamic mobilisation from the early decades of 
the twentieth century, was far more stable than at the Petite Côte. Oumar Bayo Fall was 
another supporter of the Socialist Party. After the split of the party in 1948, he went into 
trouble because of his political affiliations in a canton classified by the French as seng-
horiste. He had to struggle with the intrigues of enemies, and local populations refused 
to pay him the taxes, which was the most efficient means to make the colonial authori-
22 Archives Nationales Sénégalaises, Dakar (ANS), 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notice de Renseignements 
concernant le Chef de Canton Sossé Fall – Canton du Bayar-Nianing (Subdivision de M’Bour) (without number), 14 Aug. 1944; 
ANS, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour to Commander of Cercle of Thiès, Remplacement Socé Fall Chef Can-
ton M’Bayar Nianing (n.º 205/C), 28 Dec. 1945, 1; ANS, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour to Commander of 
Cercle of Thiès, Plainte contre ex-chef de canton Sossé Fall (n.º 90/C.), 14 April 1946; ANS, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdi-
vision of M’Bour to State Advocate in Dakar, Plainte pour abus confiance contre ex-chef canton Sossé Fall (n.º 104/C.), 29 April 
1946: 1-2.
23  ANS, 11D1/1303, Lami, Commander of Cercle of Thiès, to Bailly, Governor of Senegal (n.º 676/AGC), without date: 1.
24 ANS, 11D1/1303, Goujon, Secretary-General of Senegal, to Commander of Cercle of Thiès, Chefferies Cantons Nianing et Thor 
Diander (n.º 1175/APA/2), 8 Nov. 1951.
25  ANS, 11D1/1303, Socé Fall, Chief of canton of Nianing, to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (without number), 27 June 
1951: 1.
26 ANS, 11D1/1303, Socé Fall to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (without number), 26 June 1951: 1-2. On Armand N’Diaye 
and party politics, see ANS, 11D1/1303, Armand N’Diaye, Chief of canton of M’Bayar, to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour 
(without number), 17 June 1952: 1.
27  ANS, 11D1/1303, Berthet, substitute of Goujon, acting Governor of Senegal, to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (n.º 1616/
APA/2), 15 March 1954; ANS, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Fall Sossé Chef 
de 6.ª classe du Canton de Nianing (without number), 20 March 1958, 2.
28  ANS, 11D1/1303, Valdiodio N’Diaye, Senegalese Minister of the Interior, Arrêté portant fin de détachement d’un Chef de Canton 
(n.º 11261/MINT/APA), 5 Nov. 1959.
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ties doubt the performance of a ‘traditional chief’.29 Despite these odds, Oumar Bayo 
Fall managed to arrange himself with the local notables. After much effort in stylizing 
himself as “servant of the people”, he again became respected by the local populations.30 
In 1954, he could even permit himself an attempt at sabotaging the political campaign of 
the BDS in his canton, which did not have any outstanding but some success. Fall would 
escape with that unpunished.31 In the final years of the colony, he became a thoroughly 
well-respected chief, and he managed to make his son Babacar become the ‘traditional 
ruler’ in the neighbouring canton of Diet-Salao in as late as in 1957, with semi-autonomy 
of France’s African territories already being in place.32 The fact that in September 1957 he 
negotiated admission into the Bloc Populaire Sénégalais (which was then the new name 
of Senghor’s and Dia’s party) helped him to stabilise this position.33
In other parts of Senegambia, the authority of the chiefs was less contested between 
1945 and 1958. In the region between the Cap-Vert Peninsula and the mouth of River 
Senegal, important rulers had enjoyed considerable respect as garmi yi and ‘governors’ 
of provinces of the precolonial state of Kajoor, and this appears to have strengthened 
the institution of chieftaincy in this region during the twentieth century, even after the 
Second World War. Therefore, the family of the Sall in the area of Tivaouane – a real 
dynasty indeed – never had any difficulties with political struggles.34 For a chief such as 
Sangané Sall, the only problems he encountered were those between Fulbe herdsmen 
and Wolof cultivators in his canton, which were endemic during the whole period of 
colonial rule (and beyond).35 However, those problems were old, and while the chief did 
not always manage to prevent the adversaries from fighting, he at least knew how to deal 
with them without losing anything of his authority.
To guarantee a chief’s political survival in Senegal during the 1940s and the 1950s, a 
couple of factors were at least useful. Successful chiefs at the level of the canton fre-
quently had some sort of ‘western education’. In the local arena, which increasingly 
became an electoral battlefield, these qualities made it easier for a ‘traditional ruler’ to 
be publicly perceived as standing at the same level as the general councillors. Chiefs 
also had obtained prestige as army recruits and soldiers. However, these characteris-
tics – which mainly influenced the chief’s relationship to administrators and African 
clerks – were only a part of the picture. Most of the successful chiefs could equally boast 
of a ‘traditional’ family prestige in the larger region, if not necessarily in the particular 
district they administered: Socé Fall could claim succession from the Damel of Kayoor; 
29  ANS, 11D1/95, Frament, Administrator of Central Subdivision of Diourbel, Notes de l’Administrateur (without number), without 
date.
30  ANS, 11D1/95, Berthet, Commander of Cercle of Diourbel, Appréciations Générales du Commandant de Cercle (without number), 
2 March 1953.
31 ANS, 11D1/95, Stroh, Administrator of Central Subdivision of Diourbel, Note à classer au dossier de M. Fall Oumar Bayo, chef du 
canton du M’Bayar (n.º 332/C), 5 July 1954.
32  ANS, 11D1/95, Blaud, Administrator of Cercle of Diourbel, Notes sur la manière de servir de Fall Omar Bayo chef de canton 8ème 
classe (without number), 3 Jan. 1957: 1; ANS, 11D1/95, Commander of cercle of Tambacounda, to Valdiodio N’Diaye (n.º 77), wit-
hout date.
33  ANS, Fonds Conseil de la Présidence du Sénégal, 203, Abdoul Aziz Ibra Wane, Ministry of the Interior, Information Service, 
Cercle of Diourbel, Bulletin d’Information (without number), 24 September 1957: 1.
34 ANS, 11D1/1393, Piganiol, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sangoné Sall chef de 4.ª 
classe (without number), 23 April 1957: 2.
35  ANS, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sangoné Sall chef de Quatrième 
classe (without number), 3 March 1958: 2.
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Oumar Bayo Fall had links to both the dynasties of the Damel of Kayoor and the Teeñ 
of Bawol; Sangané Sall referred to the ruling Tukulor family of the Fuuta Tooro.36 The 
most important element of a strategy of survival, however, was to conform to the 
expectations of the local populations, particularly of the influential personalities, and, 
if any possible, to enter the networks of territorial councillors and other protectors. In 
the cases analysed above, the chiefs had energetically and successfully pursued similar 
strategies.
Against the expectations of many historians representing a ‘radical’ and anticolonial 
form of historiography, chieftaincy remained so prestigious in the Senegal of the 1940s 
and 1950s that the posts were actively sought for by many candidates. Some individuals, 
who could only claim a ‘civilised’ education and, eventually, a distinction as war vet-
erans, mobilised all their means and contacts to obtain a ‘traditional post’. In the case 
of Sada Maka Sy, a barrister in Podor, then Tambacounda, such an engagement could 
become a veritable obsession. However, together with several other cases, it shows that 
chieftaincy had lost very little of its attraction under the late colonial state.37
It needs to be pointed out that in the case of French-ruled Senegal, the demands for adap-
tation were very high, even if several chiefs – as we have shown – were able to perform 
quite well in this context. Where politicisation was imagined to rely from the outset 
on the contribution of the chiefs, there was still less danger that these chiefs would get 
into conflict with the principal political parties in the making. In the Gambia, where the 
British colonial administrators planned with the United Party (UP) as main force, and 
the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) as a competitor in very circumscribed ‘Mandinka 
zones’, things thus appeared to be even easier, and before the 1962 elections that surpris-
ingly brought the PPP into power, this was indeed so.38
Over much of the late 1940s and the 1950s, in the Gambia’s Upper River Division, the 
local chiefs were therefore able to ignore most of the democratisation process that was so 
violent for their ‘colleagues’ in ‘traditional power’ only a hundred kilometres further to 
the north. As political affiliations seemed to be clearly distributed, there were no alterna-
tive forces where potential adversaries of a ruling chief could turn to. In rural Gambia, the 
criteria of maintaining power consequently were less demanding: it was essential, how-
ever, to adapt to the wishes of the local notables. Influential seyfus such as Yugo Kasseh 
Darammeh of Sandu District and Nanjang Sanyang of Kantora District were careful to 
work with the local ‘big men’.39 Only in this case of a stable co-operation was it possible 
to establish a real family dynasty for more than one generation as can be observed for 
the third seyfuship of the division, in the Wuli District. Here, the Wali family of Kanda 
Kassa Jawara had built up a strong claim for the chieftaincy, and this in spite of the fact 
that they did not have any reference to the precolonial heritage of this former independ-
ent state.40 The authority of precolonial traditions was in any way less important than 
36  ANS, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Fall Sossé Chef de 6.ª classe du Canton 
de Nianing (without number), 20 March 1958: 2; ANS, 11D1/1393, Auchapt, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur 
la Manière de Servir de Sall Massamba Kangué chef de Canton Hors classe (without number), 20 June 1959: 1.
37  ANS, 11D1/1095, Maka Sy to Colombani, Governor of Senegal (without number), 7 April 1955, 1; ANS, 11D1/1095, Tomasini, 
Commandant de Cercle of Tambacounda, to Colombani (n.º 181/CT), without date (arrives 10 Sep. 1956).
38  HUGHES & PERFECT, 2006: 134-159.
39  National Record Service of the Gambia (NRSTG), ARP 31/10, District Commissioner of Upper River Division, Annual Report of 
the Upper River Division 1951 (without number), 22 May 1952: 18-19.
40 Ibid.: 17.
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was the necessity to seek an alliance with influential local spokespersons. Under the 
prospects of liberalisation after 1945, populations were even in the Gambia reluctant 
against any behaviour of the chiefs that could be considered too autocratic. Therefore, 
seyfu Jawaru Kurubali of Fuladu East District suffered severe difficulties during a con-
flict with the native treasury scribe: under normal conditions, his authority would have 
been sufficient to easily get the upper hand, but his reliance on very authoritarian meas-
ures gave his opponents a foothold. The latter now claimed that the contender was a 
representative from an ancient chiefly family, while the chief in power was not.41 Only 
in the Gambia’s Western Division do we find constellations in which local populations 
tried to mobilise the PPP against unpopular chiefs, such as in Kassagne, where the local 
‘traditional ruler’ had in an early phase declared himself for the UP.42 However, similar 
mobilisation attempts rarely turned into open struggle such as in Senegal.43 All in all, 
the chiefs of Gambia’s different divisions did not get under any visible pressure from 
the changes in the political constellation inside of the country before independence. As 
from the outset the process of decolonisation in this small British colony was planned as 
based on the participation of the chiefs, there were less antagonisms between the new, 
‘modern’ institutions and the existence of ‘traditional power’.
In a broader panorama encompassing West Africa, one could nevertheless argue that 
the region of Senegal – such as indeed the Gambia – was an atypical case, as with regard 
to the nature of the transfer of power, the process was extremely calm. If there was a 
prolonged real struggle between rural populations and the colonial power following the 
Second World War, would this imply a process in which chieftaincy was seen as out-
moded at an earlier stage? For the French empire in West Africa, the obvious test case is 
Côte d’Ivoire – a territory shaken by a violent struggle between 1947 and 1950.
The role of the chiefs in a proto-nationalist struggle: 
Côte d’Ivoire after the Second World War
In the 1940s, the colony of Côte d’Ivoire was the first French territory where local 
African politicians organised a strong and all-encompassing political party. The latter 
was based on the Syndicat Agricole Africain, a local union of coffee planters, and thus 
had, other than many of the newly founded political movements, some early poten-
tial of grassroots mobilisation. The Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) was 
from October 1946 part of the inter-territorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
(RDA) that comprised parties from all the French territories on the African continent. 
The RDA had delegates in the French National Assembly in Paris who, until 1950, were 
allied to the French Communists, receiving logistic support from the PCF.44 The French 
administration saw in the group led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, future Ivorian star 
politician and president of the independent country, a dangerous movement acting in 
41  NRSTG, ARP 31/10, District Commissioner of Upper River Division, Annual Report of the Upper River Division 1951 (without 
number), 22 May 1952: 17-18.
42  NRSTG, CRU 1/3, District of Commissioner Western Division, Western Divisional Bulletin 15th July - 25th August, 1960 (n.º PA 
13/3/26), 2 Sep. 1960.
43  NRSTG, CRU 1/3, District of Commissioner Western Division, Western Divisional Bulletin 15th-30th June, 1960 (n.º PA 13/3/25), 
6 July 1960.
44 BENOIST, 1982: 103.
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the interest of Moscow and whose intention was to destroy the ‘traditional harmony’ 
in the country.45
However, closer analysis shows that the leaders of the new political force in the terri-
tory of Côte d’Ivoire did not at all strive to destroy the institution of chieftaincy. In this 
territory, the notion of ‘traditional rule’ had still less connection to the existence of pre-
colonial states, as political entities on the grounds that afterwards formed the colony, 
had been extremely fragmented. Their disappearance had been far less spectacular than 
in Senegal. Nevertheless, even more than in ‘peaceful’ Senegal, ‘traditional posts’ were 
an extremely important asset in the political struggles after the Second World War. The 
RDA attempted to support its own sympathisers within the local ‘noble families’, while 
rivals of the paramount chiefs in power swore allegiance either to Houphouët-Boigny or 
to his political rivals in an attempt at getting hold of the posts.
Thus, in the district of Agboville, a considerable group of inhabitants of the chieftaincy 
of the Abbeys called in 1949 the help of the RDA to get rid of François M’Bassidje, their 
highly unpopular Paramount Chief. However, the objective of the RDA campaign follow-
ing these petitions was not the destruction of the local ‘traditional’ structures. Instead, 
the RDA militants protested to get Obodji Soboa, the predecessor of M’Bassidje, back 
into power.46 Soboa had been a long-time favourite of the local French authorities, but he 
had become an important follower of the Ake fetish and had committed illegal levies of 
funds for the benefit of the fetish cult, which motivated the French to finally remove him 
in 1942.47 The engagement of the RDA militants to get him back shows, however, that the 
memories of similar misdeeds were not necessarily very long, particularly when Soboa 
declared he would in the future act according to the wishes of his supporters.
In Abengourou, Amoakon Dihye, the deposed Paramount Chief, tried to muster support from 
the RDA in the early 1950s. He wanted to become “Houphouët’s candidate” for the chief-
taincy and hoped (in vain) that his allegiance to the party could bring him back on to the post, 
instead of Bonzou II installed as chief in 1950.48 What Dihye demanded was a real plebiscite 
about the chieftaincy, which he indeed received after a wave of local protests.49 The will of 
the majority of local people was, however, not to try it again with Amoakon Dihye.
Even the most prestigious chieftaincies in the territory, such as the paramount rulership 
of the Senufo, became the object of fierce struggle, as pretenders attempted to secure 
them with the support of the RDA. This was visible in the plots of different members 
of the leading Coulibaly family: the Paramount Chief Gbon Coulibaly himself, under 
the pressure of his family, resigned from his RDA membership. To the contrary, his son 
Dramane Coulibaly, hoping to get a foothold in the struggle for the succession of his 
ninety-year old father, had set his stakes onto the RDA; he was even arrested during the 
most violent tensions around the town centre of Korhogo.50 Gbon’s decision to leave the 
45  KEESE, 2005: 69.
46  CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Béchard, Governor-General of French West Africa, to Coste-Floret, French Overseas Minister (n.º 
680/INT/AP/2), 4 Aug. 1949. 
47  CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Péchoux, Governor of Côte d’Ivoire, to Béchard (n.º 1122/A.P.), 5 July 1949: 1-3.
48  CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Cornut-Gentille, Governor-General of French West Africa, to Pflimlin, French Overseas Minister 
(n.º 356/INT/AP.2), 27 March 1952.
49  CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Amoakon Dihye, former Paramount Chief of Abengourou, to Messmer, Governor of Côte d’Ivoire 
(without number), 1st Feb. 1956.
50  ANS, GGAOF, 17G 555, Police Services of Côte d’Ivoire, Renseignements au sujet des craintes (manifestées par l’opinion) d’éventuels 
désordres pouvant être suscités dans le Cercle de Korhogo par Dramane Coulibaly (le manchot) (n.º 3963/602)/PS/C), 30 July 1952: 1-2.
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PDCI now deprived Dramane of his chances to inherit the throne. This made, on the 
one hand, of the political struggle for party dominance in the north of Côte d’Ivoire an 
internal affair within the ‘royal family’.51 On the other hand, the alliance with the influ-
ential chief was an important asset for the leading Ivorian party. When Gbon Coulibaly 
publicly stated that he no longer wished to engage himself within the RDA, the political 
bureau sent the important party leader Ouezzin Coulibaly to personally talk to the old 
chief and make him return into the ranks of the party, in vain:
This step taken by the third important leader of the party was nevertheless inter-
esting as it shows the extreme importance the RDA gives to keeping the old chief 
in his rank and files.52
Therefore, it can be pointed out that – independently if concerning one of the few larger 
and more prestigious chieftaincies as in the case of Korhogo, or one of the smaller and 
local ones, such as in the other cases – the struggle for posts as chiefs was part of the pic-
ture in Côte d’Ivoire after the Second World War. Although the protest movement led 
by the PDCI-RDA had a very ‘modern’ agenda, focusing on social issues that linked to 
the abolition of forced labour, Houphouët-Boigny’s particular political success of 1945, 
this did not mean that the chiefs were per se defined as enemies. To the contrary, much 
of the battle for chiefly posts operated in the way of collusion between territorial move-
ment and candidates, and in which the French administration had not much to say.
The chiefs mobilise: the nationalist challenge 
and associations of chiefs in French West Africa
Contrary to what is normally written about French policy in West Africa in the 1940s 
and 1950s, the French officials there took the role of chieftaincy more serious than what 
emerges from the modernist rhetoric of the Overseas Ministry personnel.53 This was 
obviously the case concerning the particularly prestigious chieftaincies. The rulership of 
the Moro Naba of the Mossi in the territory of Upper Volta, one of the few local kingdoms 
conserved in its structures by the French conquerors, was nearly automatically among 
those whose survival was regarded as priority by colonial administrators.54 In the case 
of the Mossi, the presence of a conservative governor was particularly decisive: Gaston 
Mouragues, an official who was very sceptical towards any ‘overzealous’ attempts of 
democratization, was quite engaged to find a formula that guaranteed the participation 
of the ‘traditional power’ in local affairs. Mouragues did his best to argue that the ‘tradi-
tional ways’ of the country had to be respected.55 However, while this governor success-
fully defended the paramount position of the Moro Naba and his fellow chiefs, he failed 
with his attempt at formalising the position of the kingdom within the legal framework 
51 CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Péchoux to Béchard (n.º 668/Info), 10 June 1950: 1-4.
52  CAOM, FM 1AffPol/2174/8, Béchard to Letourneau, French Overseas Minister (n.º 493/INT/AP2), 1st July 1950: 2.
53  On this rhetoric, see DIMIER, 2002: 180.
54  See, on their particular role, MICHEL, 2nd edition 2003: 40-41.
55  Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Fonds “Dakar”, 273, Mouragues, Governor of Upper Volta, to Béchard, 
Governor-General of French West Africa (n.º 3/A.P.S./Cf), 13 Jan. 1948: 3-4; CADN, Fonds “Dakar”, 273, Mouragues to Béchard 
(n.º 16/Cab.), 18 Jan. 1950: 1-2.
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of this territory. In spite of Mouragues’s pressures, the question how chieftaincy was to 
be defined in the late colonial state was postponed again and again, until Upper Volta 
was finally independent and the new government of Maurice Yaméogo curtailed the 
rights of the chiefs in order to shut out a local competitor.56
Nevertheless, in the Upper Voltan case, the chiefs themselves reacted. They attempted 
to create an institutional framework that helped them defending their interests and 
adapting to the necessities and pressures around them. In Upper Volta such an adapta-
tion was rather easy for the chiefs of the strong Mossi aristocracy. They formed a syn-
dicat – a type of a union of chiefs – to co-ordinate their efforts in participation in local 
policy:
The interest of this development appears to lie in the fact, in particular, that the 
Larle Naba is said to have exposed to the other family members [of the dynasty 
of the Moro Naba] that the objective of such an association is not only to defend 
the interests of the chiefs but, also, to make these chiefs understand that a certain 
evolution was necessary, especially as regards the local customs, such as the appli-
cation of tattoos, the display of cadavers, the excision of girls etc … the Larle added 
nonetheless to that discourse that he was not in favour of the interdiction of this 
last traditional practice.
This would lead us to presume that the ideas discussed for some time already by 
the Governor softly make their way.57
The goal of similar associations obviously was to define, internally, which positions 
should be reformed in order to retain a local support base. The impetus for chiefs organ-
ising themselves for such an objective and in similar ways, did not need any particularly 
strong dynasty. In the district (cercle) of Thiès in Senegal, to which belonged the sub-
division of M’Bour, a number of important chiefs created their own association. In the 
Senegalese context, their objective was to counter the influence of the general council-
lors who eclipsed them with their prestige. The French Governor Bailly was distrustful 
in the beginning against any such measure, fearing that the organisation might pose a 
challenge to the administration more than to the ‘educated natives’ sitting in the General 
Council of Senegal. However, after getting used to the chiefs defending their interests, 
the local administrator became increasingly positive and recognised the success of the 
association, which continued to live until independence.58
The same solution was sought, however, in French territories where the institution 
of chieftaincy was under early pressure because of the activities of a strong local party 
that had an anti-chieftaincy agenda. This is in particular the case for Guinea-Conakry, 
where the Parti Démocratique de la Guinée (PDG-RDA), still while being an opposi-
tion party in the mid-1950s but growing steadily, pursued an aggressive course against 
56 For the political activities of the Moro Naba Kougri at the occasion of Upper Voltan autonomy in October 1958, see CAOM, FM 
1AffPol/2181/4, Moro-Naba Kougri to Berthet, High Commissioner of Upper Volta (without number), 17 Oct. 1958, and CAOM, 
FM 1AffPol/2181/4, Berthet to Cornut-Gentille, French Overseas Minister, and Messmer, High Commissioner of French West 
Africa (n.º 538/SD/Cab), 22 Oct. 1958: 4-5.
57  CADN, Fonds “Dakar”, 273, French Security Service of Upper Volta, Renseignements: Chefs Coutumiers du Pays Mossi (n.º 997/
SU/C), 24 Dec. 1952.
58  ANS 11D1/1382, Bailly, Governor of Senegal, to Lami, Commandant de Cercle of Thiès, and Lantier, Commandant de Cercle of 
Tambacounda (n.º 422/APA/2), 8 May 1950; ANS 11D1/1382, Lami to Bailly, Governor of Senegal, Association des Chefs Coutu-
miers – Réf : Votre lettre n.º 422/APA/2 du 8 Mai 1950 (nº 216/ACC), 12 May 1950: 1-2.
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the chiefs. The different chiefs in the territory – successors of a precolonial state in the 
case of the Fuuta Jallon Highlands, holders of more individualised posts within the rest 
of the territory – had early established links to different political parties, but not to the 
PDG. It thus was the strategy of Sékou Touré, the party leader, to attempt not to replace 
local chiefs by other candidates from rival houses or from their family, but to supplant 
them by own local party cells.59 The method to break the power of the local chiefs nor-
mally was brutal violence. Touré’s party profited where possible from the unpopular-
ity of several chiefs, and intimidated the rest of the populations to distance themselves 
from the local notables by sending around armed gangs. The French administration in 
de-colonising Guinea did not really see the effect of this strategy, and did not counter-
act. The attacked chiefs attempted to mobilise within the other major parties – which 
made of open terror by the PDG troops a series of armed clashes between different sup-
porters.60
Both the chiefs themselves and the French administration attempted to rescue the insti-
tution of chieftaincy in Guinea. The French Governor Jean Parisot in 1954 organised a 
conference of the most important paramount chiefs of the territory in an attempt at dis-
cussing with them the practice of chieftaincy with a view to its modernisation. At this 
occasion, it became also visible how different the position and the prestige of the chiefs 
were in the distinct regions of Guinea-Conakry. In the Futa Jallon, the paramount chiefs 
Almami Elhadj Ibrahima Sori Dara Barry Almami Alfaya and Almamy Elhadj Aguibou 
Barry Almamy Sorya still counted on widespread respect for their ‘traditional rights’. 
They expected to maintain the privileges they enjoyed in relation to their subjects, 
including unpaid labour on their fields and presents, while hoping to obtain others such 
as additional payment from the French state. On the other hand, David Sylla, Paramount 
Chief of Basse-Côte, suffered strongest from the loss of authority and pledged for French 
help to rebuild his reputation. The Malinke Chief Koly Kourouma, initiator of the con-
ference together with Parisot, was the most innovative in his proposals. Seeing that the 
intimidation campaign of the PDG was successful particularly in those parts of Guinea 
where chiefly abuses were common, he demanded for a better practice of chiefly power, 
including payment by the colonial system and more democratic consultation on the 
local level. Thus, even where the institution of chieftaincy as a whole was under siege, 
the ‘traditional rulers’ still enjoyed sufficient support to make an attempt at counter-
mobilisation.
The collective initiative of chiefs could have very different degrees of success, varying 
from territory to territory. In many cases, their activity did not have any success at all, 
mainly because after independence the newly formed governments in former French 
West Africa did their best to destroy all organisations that could become an alterna-
tive nexus of power. Even so, it shows that chiefs did adapt to the environment of party 
politics. They did their best to survive. With the very particular exception of Guinea-
Conakry, at no point was the existence of ‘traditional rule’ broadly challenged in the 
1940s and 1950s. 
59  SCHMIDT, 2007: 53-55.
60 SURET-CANALE, 1992: 134-135; CHARLES, 1992: 366-367.
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Radical politics versus clandestine continuities: 
the maintenance of influence of former chiefs 
after the abolition of chieftaincy in Guinea-Conakry
Koly Kourouma’s initiative in Guinea came by far too late. In March 1957 already, the 
PDG celebrated a sweeping electoral success, partly through violence and gang terror. 
After this election, the party could form a one-party government for the then-autono-
mous territory. The abolition of chieftaincy was one of the first major steps decided by 
this new territorial government in Conakry.61 After Guinean independence in October 
1958, the role of the chiefs was increasingly taken over by the local prefects, who nor-
mally were followers of the PDG.62 Some of the dismissed ‘traditional rulers’ fled to 
neighbouring Sierra Leone or Liberia and attempted without much success to build up 
a guerrilla movement in the border regions.63 However, even these dramatic changes do 
not imply that the new regime had no lasting impression of the prestige that still lay 
within chieftaincy. 
In unofficial diplomatic missions, the new rulers in Conakry still used the ‘traditional 
elite’. Thus, for gaining influence in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, the Guinean admin-
istrator of Sareboido sent the deposed district chief (chef de canton) as his agent.64 
Moreover, when he himself had to go to Portuguese territory to negotiate in a case of 
kidnapping, the same administrator took it for granted that he had to address, on the 
other side of the border … the local chief!65
The situation in Guinea-Bissau shows that chiefs kept some influence in situations of 
armed conflict. In this small territory where social and political reform was delayed, 
leaders with an agenda of modernisation were behind the armed revolt of the 1960s (at 
least according to what is pointed out in most studies about the war of liberation). The 
writings of revolutionary leader Amílcar Cabral, an ally and erstwhile friend of Sékou 
Touré, were hostile enough to any future role of the chiefs.66
This did not diminish the influence of the chiefs during the war. However, it is near to 
fully ignored that chiefs played a vital role in organising a network of local support, and 
that the emissaries of the rebel groups knew this well and addressed the ‘traditional rul-
ers’ first. This was still more strongly the case for the Movimento da Libertação da Guiné 
Portuguesa, like in the activities of its agent Mamadu Carimo.67 In the leading ranks of 
this rebel group, second to Cabral’s movement before the outbreak of the revolt, we find 
a majority of chiefs.68 On the other hand, chiefs could also play a catalytic role in quell-
ing the rebellion locally. Thus, Joaquim Baticam Ferreira of Teixeira Pinto categorically 
61  SLOWE, 1991: 110-111.
62  Diplomatic Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, Paris (MAE), Direction Afrique-Levant, 1953-1959, Guinée, 6, Katz, French 
Consul in Freetown and Bathurst, to French Foreign Ministry, Directorate Afrique-Levant (n.º 15/AL), 13 Jan. 1959.
63 MAE, Direction Afrique-Levant, 1953-1959, Guinée, 6, Katz to French Foreign Ministry, Directorate Afrique-Levant (n.º 29/AL), 
27 Jan. 1959: 1-2.
64  Arquivo Nacional da Torre da Tombo, Lisbon, Portugal (ANTT), AOS/CO/UL-32A-1, Portuguese Secret Police (PIDE), Informa-
ção – [Fronteira com a República da Guiné] (n.º 864/60-GU), 26 Dec. 1960.
65  ANTT, AOS/CO/UL-32A-1, PIDE, Informação – [Fronteira com a República da Guiné] (n.º 531/60-GU), 15 April 1961.
66  CABRAL, 1974: 86-87.
67  ANTT AOS/CO/UL-32-A-1, PIDE, Informação – [MLGC] (n.º 721/61-GU), 12 May 1961.
68  ANTT AOS/CO/UL-32-A-1, PIDE, Informação – [MLGC] (n.º 904/61-G.U.), 30 May 1961.
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refused to work with any of the rebel movements, and his attitude posed major difficul-
ties for the rebel leaders in the area.69 Far from being an anachronistic factor in the region 
under decolonisation, the chiefs thus even played a role in West Africa’s only major war 
of liberation.
Conclusion
It is obvious that in many zones of decolonising West Africa, chieftaincy was far from 
being outmoded. However, the limits of what chiefs could afford to do for their per-
sonal well-being if not material enrichment were more restricted than what had been 
widespread half a century earlier. It was no longer possible to practise an abusive form of 
chiefly rule that only focused on self-enrichment. However, this did not minimise the 
attraction those posts held for the locals. The examples for tensions around chieftaincy 
from Côte d’Ivoire show that competition for chiefly posts was fierce. In the rural areas, 
being a chief remained an attractive option.
Adaptation was the way to go for the chiefs, and such a strategy would be pursued by 
the successful holders of a chieftaincy. In the 1940s and 1950s, West African chiefs were 
likely to be caught in party politics at some point of their career, and perhaps yet at the 
losing side in an electoral battle. Our examples from Senegal (and from the Gambia) or 
from Côte d’Ivoire, point exactly in this direction. Clever representatives were never-
theless capable to balance the odds: the best strategy was to concede to the wishes of 
the local notables whenever possible, this involving a course in which the chief corre-
sponded to local customs as defined not by himself or by some metaphysical customary 
guides, but by constant renegotiation, to the favour of the locals.
Local populations respected chieftaincy as long as the chiefs accepted their boundaries. 
Ambitious individuals, even if far away from formulating any dynastic claims, would 
therefore not hesitate to aspire for a post as chief. Elections of rulers remained to be 
real and important events. Even where chieftaincy was abolished during the course of 
decolonisation, the new rulers knew that informal loyalties to ‘traditional rule’ were still 
existent. They were not embarrassed to use these links for their own political objectives, 
as in the case of the two Guineas. 
Thus, historians are not to be surprised by the fact that in many postcolonial West African 
countries chieftaincy has again become an important factor, particularly from the 1990s. 
On the one hand, the prestige of the institution was, in many cases, unbroken. On the 
other hand, it is a myth that the decolonising colonial powers and early autonomous and 
independent governments embraced an unambiguous policy of ‘modernisation’ and of a 
removal of the chiefs. In fact, most late colonial administrations were caught in the con-
tradiction between their commitment to create democratic and modernised structures 
and a rather instinctive impression that the ‘traditional rulers’ were still important. The 
attempts of European officials to react on this situation were manifold. What the colo-
nial regime did not accomplish in the transitory period to decolonisation was a regula-
tion of the position of chiefs that would have been viable for the time after. Thus, after 
independence, it was easy for the new authoritarian regimes to finish with a potential or 
existing opposition coming from local ‘traditional’ leaders.
69  ANTT AOS/CO/UL-32-A-1, PIDE, Informação – [Guiné Portuguesa] (n.º 163/61-GU), 8 Feb. 1961.
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